Masters of Science |

MSc
 

SUMMARY SYLLABUS

Game Theory

 

Academic Year 2007-2008

Instructor: Catarina Reis

3rd Trimester

                              

Course Objectives

This course offers an introduction to non-cooperative game theory, with applications to relevant economic topics. The course is intended for master’s students who wish to develop a solid background in this area.

Course Description

Part I – Static Games of Complete Information (3-4 lectures)

A.      Modeling Strategic Interaction (G 1.1A, 1.1B)

B.      Nash Equilibrium (G 1.1C, 1.2)

C.      Mixed Strategies (G 1.3)

Part II – Dynamic Games of Complete Information (3-4 lectures)

A.      Extensive Form Games (G 2.1, 2.4)

B.      Subgame Perfection (G 2.2)

C.      Repeated Games (G 2.3)

Part III – Static Games of Incomplete Information (2-3 lectures)

A.      Types (G 3.1A, 3.1B)

B.      Bayesian Equilibrium (G 3.1C)

C.      Examples (G 3.2)

Part IV – Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information (2-3 lectures)

A.      Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (G 4.1)

B.      Signaling (G 4.2)

C.      Reputation (G 4.3)

Required Textbook

Robert Gibbons, A Primer in Game Theory, Pearson, 1992

Grading

Midterm written exam: 90%

Participation in Problem Set discussion: 10%

Contact Hours per Week

Tuesdays and Thursdays from 5 to 6:30 pm